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COMMENTS
"Real as Pro Wrestling": Johns Hopkins University v.
CellPro and the Federal Court's Power of Review in Patent
Infringement Actions.
Gretchen Dunbarf
I. INTRODUCTION
CellPro, a biotechnology company in Seattle, Washington,
developed an extraordinary device.1 Its Ceprate system separates
stem cells from blood and enables the reintroduction of healthy stem
cells into patients who have undergone debilitating radiation
treatment.2 This device was so effective that it cured CellPro's own
CEO, Rick Murdock, of his deadly form of cancer. 3 The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved CellPro's Ceprate system for
sale in the United States, 4 but it is not on the market.
5
The Ceprate system is not for sale because the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware found that CellPro willfully
infringed four patents in the creation of the Ceprate device.6 Those
four patents were initially found to be invalid in a jury trial.7
However, the district court overturned the jury's decision by granting
the patents' assignees and licensees' motion for judgment as a matter
t B.A., Anthropology, University of California, San Diego, 1997; J.D. Candidate, 2002,
Santa Clara University School of Law. The author would like to thank Karen Spindler and
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1. See RICK MURDOCK & DAVID FISHER, PATIENT NUMBER ONE: A TRUE STORY OF
How ONE CEO TOOK ON CANCER AND BIG BUSINESS IN THE FIGHT OF HIS LIFE 4-5 (2000).
2. See id. at 5.
3. Id. at 223. Rick Murdock suffered from mantle cell lymphoma, a deadly cancer that
affects the blood.
4. Id. at 240.
5. Id. at 291.
6. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 185-86 (D. Del. 1997).
7. Id.
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of law ("JMOL") using de novo review. 8 After its own de novo claim
construction, the district court remanded the case to another jury. 9
That jury trial found CellPro had willfully infringed the patents. 10
That decision was upheld on appeal" and as a result CellPro
dissolved, along with its Ceprate system. 12 This cancer-curing device
was shelved.
13
Rick Murdock comments on his experience with CellPro,
Ceprate, and the district court in his book, Patient Number One.14 He
describes the entire process as "a sham, a kangaroo court... about as
real as pro wrestling."' 5 Rightfully upset, Murdock was on the losing
side of the case that destroyed the very technology that saved his
life. 16  Stem cells continue to help biomedical research gain
significant ground in the fight against cancer and other life-
threatening diseases. 17  Yet the rush by scientists to patent their
discoveries creates tension between open scientific research, and
exclusivity and profit protection. This tension is all the more evident
when life-saving technology is at stake because it is difficult to
morally justify restricting technology that could eradicate debilitating
diseases for the sake of exclusive intellectual property rights. Is
Murdock right? Was his experience with the justice system a sham?
Is the district court's review of jury verdicts too powerful? Maybe
Markman'8 has changed the patent review system too much.
The opinion in Markman anticipated the possibility of "certainty
in claim construction ... early settlements, reduced litigation costs,
and increased judicial efficiency."' 9 In practice however, it has had
8. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 312-13, 328 (D. Del. 1996)
(discussing the court's holding and determination of applicability of de novo review).
9. See Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 184.
10. Id. at 185.
11. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12. See MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 288-89.
13. Id. at291.
14. See MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1.
15. Id. at 244.
16. See id. at 268-71.
17. See STEMCELLS, INC., TECHNOLOGY: OVERVIEW, at
http://www.stemcellsinc.com/tec/tec001.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). See also Rachel
Nowak, Tumour Tracker: Stem Cells Are a Versatile Tool Against Brain Cancer, NEW
SCIENTIST, Apr. 15, 2000, at 5.
18. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
19. Gwendolyn Dawson, Note, Matchmaking in the Realm of Patents: A Call for the
Marriage of Patent Theory and Claim Construction Procedure, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1257, 1270
(2001).
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the opposite effect.2 0 The Federal Circuit now reverses approximately
forty percent of the claim constructions it reviews on appeal.2'
Litigation is not reduced as anticipated, since "[p]arties are much less
willing to settle knowing that there exists a forty percent chance that
the Federal Circuit will reverse the claim construction and remand the
case for trial under a new construction."2 2 If reality after Markman is
a system fraught with uncertainty and added expense, 3 one cannot
help but agree with Murdock. After all, the patent system was created
to "promote the progress of science and useful arts" by protecting
rights of inventors2 4  Congress created the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit as a court with exclusive jurisdiction
over patent-related appeals.2 5 Congress hoped to avoid forum
shopping and create certainty in patent cases. 6 Further adding to the
confusion is that the United States Constitution protects the right to a
trial by jury.27 Unless Congress takes the Federal Circuit one step
further by creating an even more highly-specialized patent court
system, a jury should be allowed to continue its fact-finding function
in patent claim construction without the threat of de novo review by
the Federal Circuit.
II. PATENT PROTECTION AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
The Constitution attributed to Congress the role of promoting
"the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries. 2 8 The Framers found value in the right of
an inventor to protect the property interests in his invention29 and
sought to protect the inventor.30 A patent system was seen as a way
of protecting the public's interest in innovation and allowing the
public to benefit from that innovation.3 ' Such public benefits are the
"protection of investments in inventions and expansion of the public
20. Id. at 1270-71.
21. Id. at 1270.
22. Id. at 1274.
23. See id. at 1270-74.
24. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
26. H.R. REp. No. 97-312, at 20-22 (1981).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29. Dawson, supra note 19, at 1258-59.
30. Id. at 1263.
31. Id. at 1259.
278 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 18
domain by encouraging the disclosure of trade secrets. '3 2 In areas
like medicine, where the goals of research and invention are
eliminating life-threatening human disease, the question remains
whether the rush to patent places "undue constraints on knowledge in
the public domain. 33
One such example is the wealth of research on human and
animal stem cells. Multi-cellular life starts with a single cell. 34 That
cell divides, specializes, and becomes an entire human being.35 As
cellular division progresses, specialized pluripotent cells develop that
"can give rise to cells that have a particular function," such as
becoming a heart cell or a lung cell. 36 One of the best-understood
stem cells so far is the blood stem cell.37 From blood stem cells one
can "grow an entire immune system and all the blood cells necessary
to circulate oxygen to the tissues. 3 8 Scientists hope to locate these
pluripotent cells, since their discovery could unlock the key to human
development.
39
Deciphering the cell-specialization process through stem cell
research would not only augment the understanding of human
development, but would also increase the likelihood of curing many
diseases. 40  Although stem cells are powerful and crucial to
development, they are "very rare and difficult to locate." 41 Dubbed
the "Holy Grail," biomedical researchers are still working to isolate
stem cells in the hope they can be cultured, grown, and used to repair
damaged cells.42  Many life-threatening diseases and chronic
disorders result from "disruption of cellular function" and the
"destruction of tissues of the body.' '43  Stem cells are a potential
32. Id. at 1260. See also DONALD CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 70-81
(2d ed. 2001).
33. Dawson, supra note 19, at 1260.
34. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: A PRIMER (May 2000) [hereinafter
PRIMER], at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 25.
39. Lisa Krieger, Repairing the Brain, S.J. MERC. NEWS, Apr. 25, 2000, at 1-2F.
40. PRIMER, supra note 34.
41. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 308 (D. Del. 1996).
42. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 25. See also Daniel Q. Haney, Working
Kidney Built From Embryo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL
11685723.
43. PRIMER, supra note 34.
2002] "REAL AS PRO WRESTLING"
"renewable source of replacement cells" 4 that, if isolated, could
regenerate an "entire immune system" and make organ and tissue
transplants "safe and reliable. 4 5  Key stem cell-related treatment
would focus on "human development abnormalities" or the
"regulation of uncontrolled cellular growth associated with cancer"
with the ultimate goal of "new drug targets and test potential
therapeutics.4 6 If stem cell research is allowed to continue,47 future
discoveries could promise treatments, or even cures, for spinal cord
injuries, heart disease, Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease,
arthritis, and other debilitating human diseases. 8
One example of the drive to research and patent stem cell
procedures is StemCells, Inc. (StemCells), a Palo Alto, California
company. The focus of StemCells' research is brain, liver, and
44. Id.
45. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 25.
46. Statement of National Institutes of Health Before the Senate Appropriations
Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies, (Aug. 1,
2001) [hereinafter Statement] (statement of Maria C. Freire, Ph.D., Director, National Institutes
of Health Office of Technology Transfer), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/080101freire.htm.
47. Even though stem cell research may lead to the cure of some of the most threatening
of human diseases, their source has caused political controversy that has restricted research. In
order to find these cells, researchers must go back in time to the early stages of human
development, when the body's systems are being formed-the embryonic stage. Krieger, supra
note 39, at IF. Until August 25, 2000 there was a ban in the United States on federally funded
stem cell research derived from human fetal tissue. Id. See generally National Institutes of
Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976
(Aug. 25, 2000), corrected 65 Fed. Reg. 69,951 (Nov. 21, 2000), withdrawn 66 Fed. Reg.
57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/stemcellguidelines.htm.
At the same time, the government of the United Kingdom, supported by the British Medical
Association, proposed a lifting of a similar ban in the UK. Georgina Kenyon, UK Medical
Group Backs Stem Cell Research, REUTERS HEALTH, Nov. 17, 2000. Prior to the November
2000 presidential election, there was growing concern among the stem cell research community
that a conservative presidential administration would reinstitute the ban and further hamper
important research. Interview with George Dunbar, Former President and CEO, StemCells,
Inc., in Los Gatos, Cal. (Aug. 25, 2000). As feared, federal funding for stem cell research was
limited in 2001. Federal research grants will only be available to further research on stem cell
lines in existence prior to 2001. Future funding is limited out of the fear that taxpayer money
would be used to "sanction or encourage further destruction of human embryos that have at least
the potential for life." President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200l/08/2000l809-2.htm. However, the United
States is not the only country favoring a limit to stem cell research. A recent vote of the German
Parliament "signifies a tightening of restrictions for researchers." Lucian Kim, Germany
Tightens Stem-Cell Imports, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 1, 2002, at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0201/pO8sOl-woeu.htm.
48. PRIMER, supra note 34. See also Nowak, supra note 17.
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pancreatic stem cells. 49  Using stem cells that have "already
committed themselves to become brain cells," StemCells hopes that
once implanted these cells will "connect with other neural cells and
set up the brain's circuitry." 50 Thus far, researchers have successfully
injected and grown new working neural tissues in laboratory mice,
coming closer to the re-growth of human brain tissue.5' They are in
the preclinical phase of testing the efficacy of these procedures to cure
degenerative brain diseases by literally re-growing healthy tissue.52 A
scientist from StemCells repaired a mouse's liver using stem cells
derived from mouse bone marrow, further evidencing the potential of
such technology.53 A hope of stem cell researchers is to develop a
"source of highly defined engraftable human cells capable of
extensive liver regeneration" as an alternative to liver transplants.54
However, the search for cures, albeit humanitarian, is not the
focus of most biomedical companies since products and sales are
what propels the market economy. 55  The force of profit-driven
companies is the patent; "the financial lifeblood of biotech.
' 56
Biotechnology companies are not left out of the rush to patent since
the holding of Diamond v. Chakrabarty57 allowed the patenting of
man-made biological material. The United States Supreme Court
held that the meaning of "manufacture" and "composition of matter"
from Title 35 of the United States Code, section 10158 included
biological organisms created by genetic engineering.5 9  The Court
concluded that it was Congress's function, "not the courts[']," to
49. See STEMCELLS, INC., TECHNOLOGY: OVERVIEW, at
http://www.stemcellsinc.com/tec/tec001 .html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
50. Krieger, supra note 39, at 2F.
51. Id. See also STEMCELLS, INC., TECHNOLOGY: NEURAL STEM CELL PROGRAM, at
http://www.stemscellsinc.com/tec/tec002.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
52. See STEMCELLS, INC., TECHNOLOGY: NEURAL STEM CELL PROGRAM, at
http://www.stemcellsinc.com/tec/tec002.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
53. Stem Cells Replace Damaged Liver Cells in Mice, REUTERS HEALTH, Nov. 16, 2000
[hereinafter Stem Cells], available at
http://www.trustmed.com.tw/news/2000/11/20/20001117019e.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
54. See STEMCELLS, INC., TECHNOLOGY: LIVER STEM CELL PROGRAM, at
http://www.stemcellsinc.com/tec/tec002a.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
55. See Kevin Berger, Buy, Cell: Did a Legal Fight over Patents Derail an Important
Cancer Treatment?, THE INSIDER, May 2000, at 17.
56. Id.
57. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or nay new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
59. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-18.
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"define the limits of patentability." 60  Focusing on congressional
testimony, the Court interpreted congressional intent for patentable
subject matter to include "anything under the sun that is made by
man."
61
StemCells is one of many companies to capitalize on the holding
of Chakrabarty. In point of fact, StemCells researchers recently
patented both a process to separate stem cells for laboratory growth
and a model for identifying progenitor cells.62 In total, StemCells
"owns or has exclusive license to twenty-five issued U.S.
patents ... as well as fifteen U.S. applications. 63
The existence of patents combined with limiting licensing
agreements can significantly hamper scientific research. There is
concern that a patent holder may "exercise its rights through licensing
in a manner inconsistent with the advancement of basic research."
64
Stuart Orkin, of Harvard Medical School, referred to stem cells and
stem cell research as "therapeutic gold" based on the potential for
development of new drugs.65  Yet patents on stem cell isolation
techniques limit access to that gold, potentially at the expense of
beneficial medical research. Patents may hold great economic value
to their holders, but there is equally significant value to society when
research is "widely available to scientists" and researchers. 66  So
while science advances through open access to research, business
advances through the restriction of access. However, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) believes effective negotiation and
"[s]trategic licensing" can "provide for the continuing availability of
exclusively licensed subject matter to researchers in order to ensure
progress of biomedical research. 67 This solution offered by the NIH
does not eliminate the conflict, and it is this very tension between
research goals and exclusive patent rights, combined with a failure to
60. Id. at 315.
61. Id. at 309.
62. U.S. Patent No. 6,238,922 (issued May 29, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,242,666 (issued
June 5, 2001). See also StemCells, Inc. Announces Issuance of Two Patents; Neutral and
Pancreas Stem Cell Portfolios Increased, BUS. WIRE: HEALTH WIRE, June 7, 2001, available at
http://www.corporate-
ir.net/ireye/ir site.zhtml?ticker=STEM&script=410&layout-9&itemid=181415 (last visited
Apr. 8, 2002).
63. Id. For example, one patent covers the method for isolating and growing human
neural stem cells.
64. Statement, supra note 46.
65. Stem Cells, supra note 53.
66. Statement, supra note 46.
67. Id.
2002]
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negotiate a license, that is at the heart of the CellPro patent
infringement case.
III. THE CELLPRO PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASE
During the 1980s scientists on opposite coasts of the United
States were working independently on techniques for isolating stem
cells. 68 Two groups were actively attempting to discover successful
procedures that would isolate stem cells. One research group, at
Johns Hopkins University, patented its procedures, 69 while the other
group, in Seattle, did not.70 The Seattle group used its technology,
formed CellPro, and took a working therapeutic device through
clinical trials. They gained approval for sale by the FDA for the
device.7 ' The Johns Hopkins group that patented the procedure
licensed this technology to Baxter Healthcare, who had not been
72
successful themselves in creating a similar device. CellPro's
attorneys analyzed Johns Hopkins' patents and believed them to be
invalid.7 3 After licensing negotiations failed between Baxter and
CellPro, Baxter, the putative licensee, sued CellPro for patent
infringement.7 4 A jury agreed with CellPro's attorneys that the
Hopkins' patents were invalid,75 but the judge, with the power to
construct the patent claim, reversed the verdict.
76
A. The Civin Patents
Curt Civin, a researcher at Johns Hopkins University Oncology
Center, was working in the 1980s on the blood stem cell isolation
problem77 to create "a purified, cancer-free suspension" to be used to
treat leukemia patients after radiation treatment.78  Civin focused
specifically on the functionality of antibodies in blood cell labeling.
79
68. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 25.
69. See U.S. Patent No. 4,714,680 (issued Dec. 22, 1987), U.S. Patent No. 4,965,204
(issued Oct. 23, 1990), U.S. Patent No. 5,035,994 (issued July 30, 1991), and U.S. Patent No.
5,130,144 (issued July 14, 1992).
70. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 27-28.
71. Id. at 240.
72. Id. at 270.
73. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Del. 1997).
74. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 52-54, 70-71.
75. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 186.
76. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 325 (D. Del. 1996).
77. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 25.
78. Johns Hopkins Univ., 931 F. Supp. at 309.
79. Id. at 308.
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He hoped to create an antibody to bind with a specific antigen on a
blood stem cell so the stem cell, once bound, could be identified from
other surrounding cells. 80  Thinking there may be a specific antigen
on immature blood cells, Civin repeatedly experimented with
different antibodies until he discovered an antibody that bound
immature blood cells effectively.8' Civin named his newly
discovered "biological homing pigeon the My-10 antibody.
'
"
82
On the opposite coast, a researcher from Seattle was working on
the same problem and developed a stem cell binding system similar to
Civin's that ultimately evolved into CellPro's Ceprate device. 83 Irwin
Bernstein, at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle,
discovered a monoclonal antibody.84 His antibody, the 12.8 antibody,
bound to a different site on a blood stem cell than Civin's My-10
antibody.85 Bernstein's antibody also possessed properties different
from the My-10 antibody.86 Specifically, the 12.8 antibody bound to
biotin.8 7 This gave the 12.8 antibody greater laboratory utility,88 since
the ability to bind to biotin allowed the 12.8 antibody to be used in
experiments with primates. 89 This factor took the researchers in
Seattle one step further than Civin's research. Biotin binds solidly
with the protein avidin.90 After binding the antibody to biotin, the
antibody could be bound to stem cells. 91 This mixture of blood cells
could then be passed through a separating device coated with avidin.92
80. See Kenneth Muhammad, Note, An Analysis of Patent Claim Construction for Newly
Invented Monoclonal Anti-bodies, Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 1998), 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 95, 96 (1999). Antibodies have binding
properties and monoclonal antibodies in particular have "antigen-specific binding sites." This
means that the reaction between antibodies and antigens is very specific: "one monoclonal
antibody interacts with one antigen." Johns Hopkins Univ., 931 F. Supp. at 308.
81. Johns Hopkins Univ., 931 F. Supp. at 309.
82. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 26.
83. Id. at 26-28.
84. See Irwin Bernstein, Therapy of Lymphoma/Leukemia with Monoclonal Antibodies
(Project CA44991), National Cancer Institute, available at
http://researchportfolio.cancer.gov/cgi-bin/abstract.pl?Term=27&CSO=5.5&ProjectlD=37559
(last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
85. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 26.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Biotin is a vitamin and this binding ability allowed 12.8 to bind with primate cells,
allowing the possibility of clinical trials with nonhuman primates. Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 311 (D. Del. 1996).
89. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 26.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id.
92. Id.
2002]
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The stem cells would stick to the avidin and separate from the rest of
the blood cells.93  The procedure ultimately worked and the "biotin
stuck to the avidin as if it were flypaper, carrying with it the antibody
and the stem cell."94  CellPro constructed their Ceprate stem cell
separation system out of this process.9 5 The My-10 antibody would
not work in the Ceprate system because the antibody lacked the
ability to bind to biotin.
96
On February 6, 1984, a patent was filed on behalf of Johns
Hopkins University. This patent issued as U.S. Patent 4,714,680 (the
'680 patent) and claimed a purified suspension of stem cells.9 7 The
second patent issued as U.S. Patent 4,965,204 (the '204 patent) and
claimed Civin's My-10 monoclonal antibody. 98 The third patent,
U.S. Patent 5,035,994 (the '994 patent) claimed a method of creating
a purified suspension of stem cells.99 The final patent, U.S. Patent
93. Id.
94. Id. at 27-28.
95. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 311 (D. Del. 1996).
96. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 51.
97. See U.S. Patent No. 4,714,680 (issued Dec. 22, 1987). Claim one recites: "A
suspension of human cells comprising pluripotent lympho-hematopoietic stem cells
substantially free of mature lymphoid and myeloid cells." Id. (emphasis added). Claim five
recites:
A suspension of human cells from marrow or blood comprising cells having a
cell-surface antigen recognized by the antibody produced by the hybridoma
deposited under ATCC Accession No. HB-8493 and substantially free of cells
that do not have a cell-surface antigen recognized by said antibody, said
suspension having the ability to restore the production of lymphoid and
hematopoietic cells to a human lacking said production.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. See U.S. Patent No. 4,965,204 (issued Oct. 23, 1990). The relevant portion of claim
one recites:
A monoclonal antibody which specifically binds to an antigen on non-malignant,
immature human marrow cells, wherein said antigen is stage specific and not
lineage dependant, and said antigen is also specifically bound by the antibody
produced by the hybridoma deposited under ATCC Accession No. HB-8483;
(a) which antigen is present on non-malignant, human blood or bone
marrow:... ;
(b) which antigen is present on a maximum of about 5% non-malignant,
human marrow cells and a maximum of about 1% non-malignant, human
peripheral blood cells; and
(c) which antigen is not present on non-malignant mature human myeloid
and lymphoid cells.
Id. (emphasis added).
99. See U.S. Patent No. 5,035,994 (issued July 30, 1991). Claim one recites:
A method of isolating a population of human cells containing pluripotent
lympho-hematopoietic stem cells comprising;
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5,130,144 (the '144 patent) claimed the method for using the pure
suspension in bone marrow transplants.100
Johns Hopkins University was granted an assignment of these
four patents and in turn licensed them to Becton Dickinson (Becton)
and Baxter Healthcare (Baxter).10 1 The Hutchinson research center
did not attempt to patent Bernstein's 12.8 antibody, but granted a
license to use the antibody to CellPro. 0 2  In December 1996, after
extensive clinical trials, CellPro's Ceprate device received approval
by the FDA.10 3 The comparable Baxter device, the Isolex system, met
with poor success' 4 and a product launch was not expected until
1999.105
When CellPro learned of Civin's patents, its attorneys evaluated
the patents and believed that two of the four patents were invalid and
therefore unenforceable.10 6 According to the court, when CellPro was
formed, its investors, officers, and directors knew of the '680
(a) providing a cell suspension from human tissue, said tissue selected
from the group consisting of marrow and blood;
(b) contacting said cell suspension with a monoclonal antibody to
immature human marrow cells that is stage-specific and not lineage
dependent so that said antibody binds to said stem cells, wherein said
antibody specifically binds an antigen on human pluripotent lympho-
hematopoietic stem cells said stem cells expressing an antigen that is
specifically bound by the monoclonal antibody produced by the
hybridomas deposited under ATCC Accession No. HB-8433 and does not
specifically bind an antigen on mature, human myeloid and lymphoid
cells; and
(c) separating and recovering from said cell suspension the cells bound by
said antibody, said bound cells being substantially free of mature
lymphoid and myeloid cells.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. See U.S. Patent No. 5,130,144 (issued July 14, 1992). Claim one recites:
A method of transplanting stem cells comprising:
(a) providing a suspension of human cells comprising pluripotent lympho-
hematopoietic stem cells substantially free of mature lymphoid and
myeloid cells, having the ability to restore the production of lymphoid
and hematopoietic cells in a patient where such production is lacking; and
(b) administering said cell suspension to a human patient in an amount
effective to effect such restoration.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
102. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 44.
103. Id. at 240.
104. Id. at 270.
105. Id. at 292. The Isolex system was actually produced by a subsidiary of Baxter
Healthcare, Nexell. Nexell announced its product launch date after acquiring CellPro
technology after the end of the lawsuit.
106. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Del. 1997).
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patent.10 7  CellPro's in-house counsel reviewed the '680 patent and
"concluded the patent was invalid."' 08  Based on review of the file
wrapper and two abstracts of Civin's work, the attorneys concluded
the patent was "invalid for obviousness."' 0 9 Civin had published his
research over a year before the patent application had been filed; thus,
Civin's own research acted as prior art against the '680 patent.' 1 0
After writing an opinion on the validity of the '680 patent,
CellPro's in-house counsel also provided CellPro with an opinion on
the '204 patent. Again, the conclusion was that the '204 patent was
invalid and unenforceable."' Its in-house counsel reported to CellPro
that the patent was "obvious in light of prior art publications" and that
"CellPro does not infringe claims 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the '204 patent."
112
Neither attorney gave an opinion regarding claims 1 or 4 of the '204
patent. Apparently concerned only with the '680 and '204 patents,"
3
no other legal opinions were given regarding the '114 or the '994
patents. Yet in preparation for its initial product launch and initial
public offering, CellPro announced in its prospectus: "Based on the
advice of Lyon & Lyon, special patent counsel to the company,
CellPro believes the.., patents are invalid and unenforceable."
'
" 
4
B. The Patent Infringement Litigation History
Even though CellPro thought the Civin patents were invalid, it
entered into license negotiations with Baxter Healthcare in an attempt
to avoid a lawsuit. 15 Negotiations failed and the licensing deal fell
through."16 CellPro then initiated a lawsuit hoping to "gain the home
court advantage" as well as a declaratory judgment that the patents
107. Id. at 187. Although Murdock claims he never knew "exactly when CellPro's
original management became aware of the existence of these patents. What is certain is that
management believed completely that these patents presented no serious legal problems."
MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 44.
108. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 187. Kiley was not only CellPro's legal
counsel but also a former partner at the law firm Lyon & Lyon with experience in both patent
prosecution and patent litigation. Id. Kiley was also counsel for Genentech and wrote the
winning brief in Diamond v. Chakrabarty. CellPro also hired a current Lyon & Lyon partner,
Coe Bloomberg, to provide an opinion on the '680 patent. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1,
at 57.
109. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 187.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 188.
112. Id.
113. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
114. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 189.
115. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 48-52.
116. Id.at52-54.
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were invalid."17  On April28, 1992, CellPro filed suit against
licensees Baxter Healthcare and Becton Dickinson in federal district
court in Seattle, Washington." 8  The court then determined Johns
Hopkins to be an indispensable party and the lawsuit was
consolidated and reorganized in Delaware." 9
In the first trial in Delaware, there was immediate concern the
technology would be too confusing for a jury, since "the language of
science does not translate easily into terms comprehensible to the
layperson.' 120 However, even with a complex set of instructions and
questions, 12 1 the jury found Civin's patents invalid. On August 4,
1995, it found the Civin patents invalid "as obvious in light of the
prior art" and invalid "as not enabled.', 1
22
After the jury verdict, Johns Hopkins filed, and was granted, a
motion for JMOL. The jury verdict was overturned. The district
court judge granted the motion on June 28, 1996 for the following
issues: 1) infringement and induced infringement of the '680 patent;
2) induced infringement of the '144 patent; and 3) enablement of the
'680 patent.123 Judge McKelvie explained that the decision to grant a
JMOL after a jury verdict involves the determination of "whether
substantial evidence exists in the record to support the jury's verdict
when the correct legal standard is applied."'' 2 4  Although Judge
McKelvie cautioned that "the court should not substitute its view of
the facts for that of the jurors,"'' 25 the prevailing ruling was derived
from Markman:
The construction of patent claims is a matter for the court. In
construing the words and phrases in a claim, the court should give
those words and phrases their ordinary meaning, unless the
specification clearly indicates that the inventor intended a different
meaning. The court may also consider other words in the claim,
117. Id. at 55.
118. Id. at 58.
119. Id. at 70-7 1.
120. Id. at 83.
121. See generally Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 894 F. Supp. 819 (D. Del. 1995)
(outlining the jury instructions and interrogatories).
122. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Del. 1997) (citing
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996)).
123. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 186.
124. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CelIPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 312 (D. Del. 1996).
125. Johns Hopkins Univ., 931 F. Supp. at 313 (citing Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr.,
49 F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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other claims in the patent, the specification, the prosecution
history, and expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence.
126
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. was a patent
infringement case in which the term "inventory" in the patent for a
dry cleaning device was at issue. 12 7 The Federal Circuit held that
district court judgments are reviewed de novo to determine whether
the lower courts' standards were "correct as a matter of law."'
128
Specifically, in the case of JMOL, "the court retains the power and
duty to say what the correct law is, and then to examine the factual
issues submitted to the jury and determine whether findings thereon
are supported by substantial evidence and support the verdict under
the law."'' 2 9 The Federal Circuit identified a conflict-whether patent
claim construction is a matter of law or fact 3°-and concluded that
131claim construction is a matter of law to be decided by the court.
Viewing what it thought were inconsistencies, 32 the Federal Circuit
definitively established that "the interpretation and construction of
patent claims, which define the scope of the patentee's rights under
the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court."'
13 3
Rationalizing the patent as a written instrument, the Federal
Circuit further explained that as a "fundamental principle of
American law," patent construction is a matter for the court to
determine. 134 As a "fully integrated written instrument," a patent is
"uniquely suited for having its meaning and scope determined entirely
by a court as a matter of law."' 135 Using a jury to decide patent
construction as a matter of fact "would at once deprive the inventor of
the opportunity to obtain a permanent and universal definition of his
rights under the patent, and in each case of infringement it would
subject him to the danger of false interpretation, from the
consequences of which he could not escape."'
136
126. Johns Hopkins Univ., 931 F. Supp. at 313 (citations omitted) (citing Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
127. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973-74 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
128. Id. at 975.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 976-77.
131. Id. at 977-79.
132. Id. at 979.
133. Markman, 52 F. 3d at 970-71.
134. Id. at 978.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 979.
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While the CellPro case was being decided, the Supreme Court
reviewed Markman.1 37 The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's right
to review patent claim construction de novo.138 Looking back to jury
practices in the 18th century, the Court found no historical standard
requiring juries to interpret patent claims.1 39  In fact, the Supreme
Court held that a judge was inherently better positioned than a jury to
construe patent claims. 140 The Court saw patent construction as
a special occupation, requiring like all others, special training and
practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely
to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and
he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a duty,
than a jury can be expected to be.' 4 1
Using this clarification from the Supreme Court, Judge
McKelvie established the "proper construction of the Civin patent
claims. 42  Focusing on the phrases "specifically binds,"'
143
"wherein,"' 44 and "substantially free,"'145 Judge McKelvie found that
"[n]o reasonable jury could conclude that CellPro did not infringe and
induce infringement of claims 1-5 of the '680 patent and induce
infringement of claims 1-4 of the '144 patent" and ordered new trials
for the '994 and '204 patents. 46 Judge McKelvie also determined
that "no reasonable jury could conclude that claims 1-5 of the '680
patent are invalid for lack of enablement."'' 47 New trials were allowed
for the remaining issues of obviousness and lack of enablement for
the '994 and '204 patents. 48  Johns Hopkins University then
withdrew its claims for the '994 and '144 patents and the district court
moved forward with a trial on damages and willful infringement. 49
On remand, the second jury found CellPro willfully infringed the
Civin patents' 50 and granted Johns Hopkins' motion for treble
137. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 379-84.
140. Id. at 388.
141. Id. at 388-89 (citing Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (CC ED Pa. 1849) (No.
10,740)).
142. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 313 (D. Del. 1996).
143. Id. at 313-14.
144. Id. at 313.
145. Id. at 318.
146. Id. at 319.
147. Id. at 325.
148. Johns Hopkins Univ., 931 F. Supp. at 328.
149. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Del. 1997).
150. Id. at 184.
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damages.'15  Critical in this decision was McKelvie's view of the
legal opinions by CellPro's in-house counsel.152 McKelvie called
CellPro's argument of reliance on advice from counsel a "weak and
disingenuous defense of alleged good-faith reliance on the advice of
counsel."' 53 He called their testimony insincere and said it lacked
credibility.154 Overall McKelvie criticized the opinions as
so obviously deficient, one might expect a juror to conclude the
only value they had to CellPro in the world outside the courtroom
would have been to file them in a drawer until they could be used
in a cynical effort to try to confuse or mislead what CellPro, its
Board, and counsel must have expected would be an
unsophisticated jury. 55
He also considered the opinions to be a "weak pass at the quality of
work one might expect from independent counsel."' 56
CellPro appealed both the JMOL and the finding of willfulness;
yet each decision, as well as the Markman standard of de novo
review, was upheld. The court of appeals explained a factual
determination of willful infringement would not be reversed "unless it
was unsupported by substantial evidence."' 57 An award of treble
damages is reviewed only for "an abuse of discretion. '5 The only
abuse of discretion by Judge McKelvie was an order for repatriation
and destruction of some CellPro technology. 159 The decisions that the
legal opinions were incompetent 60 and that both the district court and
court of appeals could review claim construction de novo 161 were
upheld.
IV. WAS MURDOCK RIGHT?
Is the patent infringement court process "about as real as pro
wrestling," as Murdock claims it is? Although questionable in light
of the judge's personal remarks regarding the case, the judgment as a
matter of law was not improperly decided. Yet the Federal Circuit
151. Id. at 196.
152. Id. at 193.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 193.
156. Id. at 194.
157. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1366.
160. Id. at 1364.
161. Id. at 1353.
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reaffirmed its power to perform de novo review. 162 This system of
review has the potential to improperly shift the balance of judicial
power and should be carefully scrutinized until Congress develops a
more specialized patent review system.
A. JMOL and Appeals
Both rights of appeal and JMOL are established by statute.1
63
However, the intersection of these procedures with the power of
review and claim construction from Marknan grants too much power
to a single judge. In CellPro's case, McKelvie first determined the
patent claim construction for the jury, 64 essentially telling them what
the patent meant. 165 Yet even after the jury entered the verdict, the
judge again intervened. 166 If the court of appeals can review the facts
as if for the first time, why have a jury at all?
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
judgment as a matter of law.' 67 Essentially, if a judge finds
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the
issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense
that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated
without a favorable finding on that issue.16
8
These motions may be made before the case is submitted to the jury
and, if the court agrees, the judge then will direct the verdict. 169
Motions may also be made after the trial, 170 but a grant of such a
motion is improper "unless there is 'such a complete absence of
evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only
have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture."",17' Therefore,
the trial judge should only grant a motion for a JMOL if "convinced
162. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, t455 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
163. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); and FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
164. See generally Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 894 F. Supp. 819 (D. Del. 1995).
165. Id. (outlining the jury instructions).
166. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
168. Id. 50(a)(1).
169. Id. 50(a)(2).
170. Id. 50(b).
171. Arkin v. Gittleson, 32 F.3d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Mattivi v. S. African
Marine Corp., 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result" and not based
on "disagreement with the jury's verdict." 172
The Constitution stipulates: "[T]he Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions,
and under such regulations as the Congress shall make., 173 Congress
has regulated the right to appeal. The United States Code established
that "the courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.'
174
However, appeals are limited at law to two situations. First, the
appeals court can consider substantial errors of law, such as errors
granting a judgment as a matter of law, or error by lawyers.
Notwithstanding that fact, an appellate court cannot re-decide the
facts. 175 The Constitution further limits appellate review by stating
"no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of
the United States, than according to the rules of common law."'
176
Secondly, an appellate court can review judicial abuse of discretion
from the lower court. 17 7 However, Markman extends this right to
appeal, allowing review to be de novo, as if for the first time; or more
simply, as if there had been no trial. 1
78
Judge McKelvie used harsh language when describing CellPro's
actions during the trial and he appears to have granted the judgment
as a matter of law merely for personal reasons. McKelvie construed
the claim for the original jury and they still decided in favor of
CellPro. 179 It is possible McKelvie was aggravated with the jurors for
disagreeing with his view of the meaning and scope of the claims. It
may be difficult to understand, at first glance, how a unanimous jury
verdict can be considered unreasonable and without sufficient
evidence. His personal contempt for CellPro (and CellPro's counsel)
is quite clear from his language. 180 He explains that the "five years of
effort to bring this matter to a resolution have left the plaintiffs with
too many examples of conduct by and on behalf of CellPro that
demonstrate contempt.., for the law; and for our system of civil
172. Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 951 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
173. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
176. Id.
177. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943).
178. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
179. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Del. 1997).
180. Id. at 193.
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justice."181 In the same opinion in which he severely criticizes
CellPro's opinion of counsel, Judge McKelvie describes their legal
arguments as having "no real basis in fact, ' 182 and the whole process
as "miss[ing] the mark in working to bring this matter to a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination."
' 8 3
Judge McKelvie's remarks, although harsh, were not necessarily
biased, because his independent analysis of the Civin patents does
support his overall finding. The descriptive requirements of the '204
patent, although broad, were not overly broad, since a proper
description of a monoclonal antibody is its binding properties. 1
4
Further, CellPro did not provide sufficient evidence in support of its
claims regarding the phrase "substantially free" in the '680 patent
1 85
and lack of enablement of the '204 patent.18 6 Additionally, CellPro
erred during the trial by allowing inconsistencies that hampered their
overall legal arguments. CellPro erred during the pleadings and
attempted during trial to raise issues not identified before trial.1 87 Its
in-house counsel's testimony at trial proved inconsistent with
CellPro's main defense,188 which was switched during the trial.
8 9
Accordingly, the grant of the motion for judgment as a matter of law
was properly granted. Even so, the new role of the Federal Circuit in
de novo review is too strong without stricter congressional guidance.
B. Criticism of Markman
As much as Markman has been criticized for focusing power on
a single judge, it has been applauded for its attempt at standardization
of the patent infringement court process. 190 For example, "Markman
clarified the role of a jury in a patent infringement case when deciding
a mixed question of law and fact."'19  Proper patent claim
181. Id. at 192-93.
182. Id. at 195.
183. Id. at 196.
184. Muhammad, supra note 80, at 107.
185. Id. at 105.
186. Id. at 107.
187. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D. Del. 1996).
188. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 189 (D. Del. 1997).
189. Id. at 194. Although not critical as a legal standard, there was additional evidence
that CelPro's counsel "attempted to and did establish an inappropriate relationship with the
court's deputy" which included "having Lyon and Lyon's litigation team take her out to dinner
during the trial." Id. at 195.
190. See Dawson, supra note 19.
191. Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All "Three"
Juries, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 6 (1999).
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construction is the "logical first step in any patent infringement suit,"
since it determines "exactly what the patented invention is." 192 Juries
are not completely eliminated, since "Markman makes it very clear
that a patent owner is entitled to a jury for infringement cases after the
claims have been properly interpreted by the court."' 193  Overall,
judges maintain control over the litigation proceedings1 94 and help
standardize the process as the original court intended. 95  One
commentator cautions critics: "[W]e have to remember that these are
patent cases, they are commercial cases, and not criminal cases. They
are not situations where we are talking about constitutional liberties
and things like that."'
' 96
In spite of some praise, Markman has been criticized for giving
too much power to a single judge and limiting rights to a trial by jury
as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. 97 For example, one such
commentary describes the decision as "plainly hasten[ing] the Federal
Circuit's move toward greater involvement as an appellate tribunal in
the sorts of de novo review that have tempted the court to take on the
role of advocate."1 98 Instead of standardizing patent cases like the
court intended, "the Federal Circuit dramatically reduces certainty
and predictability in patent appeals." 199 Because of the high risk of
claim construction's being reversed on appeal, many patent
infringement cases are tried essentially twice, with sometimes-
imaginative results.2 ° ° Where "a genuine dispute about the meaning
of a claim term exists, litigation will be required for resolution,"
regardless of whether the patent claim is interpreted by a judge or a
jury.2° 1 In one case, the Federal Circuit decided not to adopt either of
the appealing party's claims but "instead created an entirely new
192. Dawson, supra note 19, at 1265.
193. Lee & Evans, supra note 193, at 7.
194. Id. at 19.
195. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
196. R. Carl Moy, Panel Discussion: High Technology Law in the Twenty-First Century
Second Annual High Technology Law Conference, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 13, 21
(1997).
197. See Kevin W. King, Comment, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: The Jury's
Diminishing Role in Patent Law Cases, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1127 (1997).
198. William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal
Circuit's Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 748 (2000).
199. Id. at 751.
200. Dawson, supra note 19, at 1272.
201. King, supra note 197, at 1134.
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claim construction. '" 20 2  Instead of remanding the case under the
newly determined claim construction, the Federal Circuit "reversed
the trial court's ruling and entered judgment for [defendant-
appellant]" and effectively "deprived [plaintiff-appellee] of the right
to litigate the merits of its case. 20 3
The rationale for the decision in Markman is further criticized
since the Supreme Court "failed to explain why judge-interpreted
claims are more consistent than jury-interpreted ones." 204 There is no
guarantee individual judges will be consistent with one another when
deciding patent cases, and there are no safety mechanisms to "prevent
different district courts from reaching contrary conclusions as to the
meaning of claim terms when construing a single patent in separate
infringement lawsuits." 205 Overall, Markman undermines the nature
of appellate review created by the Seventh Amendment: "Our civil
litigation system is based on the premise that the trial is the most
important phase of the process. Creating a scheme wherein the most
important and often most detail-oriented issue is reviewed de novo by
an appellate court undermines that premise. 20 6
C. Criticism of Juries
Praise for Markman is typically accompanied by criticism of
modem juries. 0 7 Still, there is no evidence that juries cannot be
equally sufficient as judges in construing patent claims. As one
comedian summarized the feeling of critics: "When you go into court
you are putting your fate in the hands of twelve people who weren't
smart enough to get out of jury duty. 208  United States Patent
Quarterly conducted a study from 1989 through 1996 and found that
"juries are more likely than judges are to hold patents valid," giving
credit to the theory that juries make their decisions by emotional
response rather than logic. 20 9  Critics assume not only that juries
cannot understand complex technology, but also that they are
202. Dawson, supra note 19, at 1272 (citing Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
203. Dawson, supra note 19, at 1272-73.
204. King, supra note 197, at 1134.
205. Id. at 1150.
206. Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of
Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 671 (1996).
207. See Lee & Evans, supra note 191.
208. Leibold, supra note 206, at 623 (quoting THE SPEAKER'S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 60
(Henry 0. Dorman ed., 1987)).
209. Lee & Evans, supra note 191, at 9.
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confused by "nuances of the legal standards for patent validity and
infringement, and that they are swayed too easily by tangential
issues. '2 10 In the United Kingdom, there is concern that there are still
some cases that are "too complicated for a jury of laymen to rule
upon. ' '11 Canada also has concerns "about whether juries should be
allowed to decide relatively complex issues of Internet and
intellectual property law. ' 212  However, a "survey found that in
evaluating expert testimony, jurors use criteria as rational and
practical as those suggested by the Court of the trial judge., 21 3 Even
though jurors may not understand the intricacies of the technology at
trial, the inherent logic of the law, combined with the jury
instructions, is just as likely to lead the jury to the same result as a
trained judge with a technical background and legal experience.
D. Judicial Activism and Alternatives to Markman
An overly powerful judiciary risks upsetting the balance of
power and encourages judges to act as advocates or legislators instead
of judges. Even though the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over patent issues, it would be prudent to wait for explicit
congressional authorization before taking on this powerful role.214
Marbury v. Madison215 established that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.''116 However, the court is also bound by a "paradigm of judicial
restraint," giving deference to Congressional legislation and
abstaining from invalidating laws for social reasons.217 Too much
overreaching by the court into the function of the other two
governmental branches leads to judicial activism and could be
construed as "going beyond the substantive statutory or common law
to reach ideologically-motivated outcomes. 2 18  Additional over-
activity by the court, or judicial hyperactivity, describes "what
happens when the court from time to time loses track of the important
210. Leibold, supra note 206, at 624,
211. Matthew Knowles, Crash Widow [Sues] Couple Over Loss of Baby's Father, DAILY
MAIL, April 20, 2000, at 41.
212. John Partridge, Canadian Internet Firm Loses Suit in U.S., GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), May 12, 2000, at B5.
213. Lee & Evans, supra note 191, at 25-26.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
215. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
216. ld. at 177.
217. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
218. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 198, at 726.
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distinction between trial and appellate roles and engages in a form of
decision-making at odds with traditional notions of appellate
review. ''219 The limited deference to the trial court's judgment moves
the Federal Circuit close to overstepping the bounds of its appellate
role.
As an alternative to a federal judge or a jury, Congress could
create a specialized, exclusive patent court to hear patent cases. One
proposal is a "blue-ribbon" jury consisting of "experts in the subject
matter" for the particular issue before the court.220 Congress could
also create a specialized patent court system, comparable to the
bankruptcy court. 221 Another alternative is having experts join the
district court judge in construing patents, like the system in China
where "two 'highly specialized technicians' are appointed 'to sit
together with the judge' and hear patent cases. ' 222 Notwithstanding
its potential benefits, such a specialized system also presents a risk of
serious pitfalls. 223  Ultimately, if Congress agrees that there is an
unlawful or unconstitutional increase of judicial power, then it can
amend the Seventh Amendment to include issues of law or fact on
appellate review. For example, Louisiana stipulates in its constitution
that appellate review is extended "to both matters of law and fact. 224
Regardless of the ultimate view, the Federal Circuit must balance its
desire for standardization with the concept of separation of powers,
and wait for proper constitutional authorization before it takes on
additional power. Whatever action it takes, its goal must continue to
be stability, since "the value of the court depends on the success with
which it provides a stable and consistent law on which the technology
community can rely" for a "stable and reliable framework for
behavior. 2
25
V. CONCLUSION
After losing the fight to retain his company's technology in spite
of patent infringement, Rick Murdock described the federal district
court that heard his case as "a sham, a kangaroo court.., about as
219. Id. at 725.
220. King, supra note 197, at 1153.
221. Leibold, supra note 206, at 648.
222. King, supra note 197, at 1154.
223. J. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 683, 688 (1993).
224. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 (1954).
225. Newman, supra note 223, at 687.
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real as pro wrestling. '2 6  Although research for the fight against
cancer and other diseases is at odds with the rush to patent biological
material and processes, the justice system that hears patent cases is
not devoid of substance. The judgment as a matter of law that
decided CellPro's case was proper for the circumstances, leaving an
unfortunate result for CellPro and its technology. However,
Markman grants too much power to the federal judiciary at the
expense of a jury. The courts should avoid this standard of review
until Congress creates an alternate solution.
226. MURDOCK & FISHER, supra note 1, at 244.
